Abstract. Consumer co-operatives constitute a highly successful example of democratic forms of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually organized as medium or large-scale …rms competing with pro…t-seeking …rms in retail industries. In this paper we model such a situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer co-operatives maximize consumer-members' utilities and distribute them a patronage rebate on their goods purchase. We show that when consumers possess quasilinear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically di¤eren-tiated goods and …rms operate with a linear technology, the presence of consumer co-operatives positively a¤ects all industries output and social welfare. The e¤ect of Co-ops on welfare is shown to be more signi…cant when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand.
Introduction
Since 1844, the Rochdale pioneers'idea of cooperation has spread around the world and today more than 700 millions cooperators are active in 100 countries (ICA, 2006) . Among the various cooperative forms of enterprises, consumer cooperatives (henceforth Coops) are typically …rms which operate in retail industries pursuing the institutional objective to act on behalf of their consumer-members. 1 Today these organizations represent one of the most successful realities among existing democratic and participative forms Date: July 2010. Corresponding author: Marco Marini, Department of Economics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo" and CREI, Università Roma III. Address: via Sa¢ , 42, 60129, Urbino. Tel. +39-0722-305557; Fax:; +39-0722-305550 E-mail: marco.marini@uniurb.it.
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The paper is a re…nement of a previous draft circulated with the title "Consumer Cooperatives in a Mixed Oligopoly". We wish to thank Domenico Mario Nuti, Michael Kopel and the participants to AISSEC conference in Siena, IAFEP conference in Trento, MDEF in Urbino and CREI Seminar in Rome for useful comments and discussions. 1 Usually consumer-members are entitled to elect their representatives who participate to the assembly electing the (professional or non professional) managers running the …rm. of enterprise, able to compete against large private companies. Formed through a discontinuous process of sequential waves (see, for instance, for a brief account of the US case, Finch, Trombley & Rabas, 1998) in many countries Coops are well established without in general possessing a dominant position in retail industries, with a few exception as, for instance, Switzerland, Finland and Japan. One of the most world's well known consumer cooperative is the Cooperative Group in UK, which provides a variety of retail and …nancial services. Japan is also known to possess a very relevant consumer Cooperative movement with over 23 Sexton 1987, Farrell 1985 , and more recently, Hart and Moore, 1996 , 1998 and Mikami, 2003 , 2010 has mainly focussed on the behaviour of these …rms under either perfect competition, monopoly or monopolistic competition. However, in modern economies Coops compete strategically with traditional pro…t-maximizing …rms (henceforth PMFs), therefore giving rise to a speci…c instance of mixed oligopoly. 2 To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing contributions dealing speci…cally with mixed oligopoly between Coops and PMFs. An exception is Goering (2008) who presents a homogeneous good duopoly model between a PMF and a non pro…t …rm assumed to maximize a parametrized combination of …rm's pro…t and consumers' surplus. Moreover, there is a wide related literature dealing with mixed duopoly with a labour-managed …rm à la Ward (1958) and Vanek (1970) competing with a PMF (see, for instance Law and Stewart, 1983 and Cremer and Cremér, 1992) as well as a wide literature on agricultural cooperatives under imperfectly competitive markets (Rodhes, 1983 , Fulton, 1989 , Sexton, 1990 or under mixed duopoly with either homogeneous (Tennbakk, 1992) or vertically di¤erentiated good (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001 ). However, in general labour-managed and
In large Co-ops the assembly elects a board of directors which, on their behalf, controls the management. 2 See, for instance, Delbono and De Fraja (1990) for a survey of mixed oligopoly models with one or more publicly-owned …rm competiting with PMFs.
farmers' cooperatives are thought to behave di¤erently from an organization owned by its consumers.
The major purpose of our paper is to present a taxonomy of the results obtained in a mixed oligopoly market in which an arbitrary number of PMFs and Coops compete strategically either in quantities or in prices and goods are di¤erentiated. We model a Coop as a …rm which maximizes the utility of consumer-members and distributes them all its net surplus as a patronage rebate on their purchased goods. As a result, a Coop is shown to set in equilibrium a price equal to its average cost, thus a¤ecting the equilibrium behaviour of rival PMFs. All …rms are assumed to possess a constant returns of scale technology and therefore in equilibrium every Coop sets a price equal to its constant marginal cost. In our model, the marginal cost pricing rule emerges endogenously. This pricing rule makes the results of our model comparable to those obtained in mixed oligopoly models with state-owned and PMFs (for instance, Cremèr, Marchand and Thisse,1998 and De Fraja and Delbono, 1998). Moreover, the constant average cost assumption has the advantage to overcome many of the issues on the stability of Co-ops' membership. 3 Our model reaches a few relevant relevant results. We show that, under consumers'quasilinear preferences and …rms'linear technology, the presence of Coops in the market a¤ects positively the total industry output as well as the total industry welfare (and negatively the market prices). Under Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods it is shown that the presence of Coops pushes all PMFs out of the market (or, alternatively, oblige them to behave as perfectly competitive …rms) and by this way maximizes the total market welfare. When goods are di¤erentiated, the e¤ect of Coops on welfare is shown to be more signi…cant when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated and when competition is à la Cournot (in quantities) rather than à la Bertrand (in prices). According to these results, we should expect to see consumer cooperatives more often in markets with such features.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 and 4 present the main results of mixed oligopoly with quantity and price competition. Section 5 concludes.
The model
2.1. Consumers Preferences. The demand side of the market is represented by a continuum of identical consumers (i = 1; ::; I) of unitary total measure possessing quasi-linear preferences on n symmetrically di¤erenti-ated goods 4 x k , (k = 1; :::; n) and an outside good y. These preferences 3 See on this matter, Anderson, Maurice & Porter (1979), Sandler & Tschirhart (1981) , Sexton (1983) and Sexton & Sexton (1990) . 4 Each good can also be interpreted as a bundle of goods sold by every …rm in the market.
can be expressed, for each consumer, by a utility function U i : R n+1 + ! R + de…ned over the n products and a separate numeraire good y, as (2.1) U i (x 1 ; x 2 ; :; x k; ::; x n ; y) = u i (x 1 ; x 2 ; :; x k; ::; x n ) + y i in which u i (:) is smooth, increasing and strictly concave in every good x k .
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If the available income of every consumer (denoted y i ) is high enough, the downward-sloping individual inverse demands can be obtained from the …rst-order conditions for the maximization of problem (2.1) under budget constraint, as
:; x k; ::; x n ; y) @x k ; for x k > 0 and k = 1; 2; :::n:
2.2. Industry. In the retail industry we assume that in general n …rms supply n di¤erentiated goods (or bundles of goods) whose m are supplied by consumer cooperatives and (n m) by traditional pro…t-maximizing …rms. We will denote by M N the subset of …rms which are Coops. As usual, PMFs …rms are assumed to maximize pro…ts as (2.2) k (x 1 ; :::
Let every …rm' total costs be linear and, for simplicity, …rms do not bear …xed costs. As anticipated, Coops are assumed to act on behalf of their consumer-members, therefore maximizing the utility function of every ith representative consumer-member. More speci…cally, every member of the Coop receives a patronage refund in proportion to the goods he has purchased over the …rm's total sales. The following objective-function is therefore assumed for every Coop j 2 M , (2.3) 8 > > < > > :
Analogously, when price instead of quantity is the choice variables of every …rm, the above objective functions for PMFs and Coops can be expressed as a function of the price vector (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::p n ). For every j 2 M the FOC of problem (2.3) provides the following condition for an interior maximum,
as long as the equilibrium price is su¢ ciently high to generate non negative pro…ts, that is, for p j (x 1 ; :
. The meaning of (2.4) is that a Coop, acting on behalf of its consumer-members, sets its quantity to equate every consumer-member's willingness to pay for good j to the average cost of this good, 6 in order to distribute the maximum consumers'surplus to its members. Since here …rms possess a constant returns of scale technology, every …rm's marginal cost will be just equal to its average cost. The use of a di¤erentiated goods oligopoly is a feature which distinguishes our setup from the numerous existing mixed oligopoly models in which, either state-owned …rms (Marchand et al. 1998 for instance) or no-pro…t organizations (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001, Goering, 2008 ) compete with PMFs, but goods are in general homogeneous.
It can be useful to compare problem (2.3) to the case in which a social manager is assumed to coordinate all existing consumer cooperatives in order to maximize the utility of all existing consumers. In this case we should expect that FOC becomes, for every j 2 M (2.5)
@p r (x 1 ; ::; x n ; y) @x j :
Therefore, for the collectivity of consumer-members the best pricing policy would be to set a price lower than average cost when product are substitute ( @pr(x 1 ;::;xn;y) @x j 0) and higher than average cost when products are complements ( @pr(x 1 ;::;xn;y) @x j 0).
Oligopoly with Quantity Competition
In order to study the implications of the simultaneous presence of both PMFs and Coops in an oligopolistic market, let the following utility function represent the preferences of every i-th consumer in the economy, (i = 1; ::; I):
represents the degree of product di¤erentiation. For = 0, goods are independent and for = 1 goods are perfect substitute. Moreover, for < 0 goods become complement. The FOCs of (3.1) yield linear inverse demand functions for every good k = 1; 2; ::; n given by
It is easy to see that the FOC of problem (2.3) yield the following conditions for every Coop producing the j-th good 6 Similarly, if competition is in prices, a Co-op will set a price equal to the average cost. 7 See Shubik ans Levitan (1971), Vives (1984) and Dixit (1983) for further details on this utility speci…cation.
Expression (3.3) can be considered as the FOC of every Coop acting on behalf of consumer-members.
3.1. The Benchmark Case: Oligopoly with all PMFs. As a benchmark case of our results we start illustrating the case in which all …rms are PMFs and choice variables are quantities. Let all …rms k = 1; 2; :::n possessing identical strategy sets X k = [0; 1) and identical technology, expressed by a linear cost function, c k (x k ) = cx k with 0 < c < . When …rms are all PMFs they simply maximize their pro…t with respect to the quantity of the k-th good, (3.4) k (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) = (
Solving the maximization problem, the following best-replies are obtained for every k-th PMF,
where x k = (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x k 1 ; x k+1 ; ::; x n ) and therefore pure-PMF Nash equilibrium quantities (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) are easily obtained as
for each k-th PMF and prices are
It easy to see that, for = 1, (3.5) becomes the usual Cournot solution with homogenous good (x k = ( c) = (n + 1)), while for = 0 the goods are independent and …rms act monopolistically (x k = ( c) =2).
3.2.
Mixed Cournot Oligopoly. Let us imagine now that m …rms in the market (m n) transform into Coops accepting all consumers as their members. The market turns therefore into a mixed oligopoly in which m Coops compete against (n m) standard PMFs. Let M N denotes the set of all j-th Coops and then N nM is the set of all remaining h-th PMFs.
Using (3.3) and (3.4), the following best-replies are obtained for Coops and PMFs respectively, as a function of the quantities of the other type of …rms only:
, 8j 2 M;
, 8h 2 N nM:
The mixed oligopoly Nash equilibrium output, denoted x with m Coops and (n m) PMFs is therefore obtained as
and (3.9)
with corresponding equilibrium price
for every h-th PMF and p j (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ) = c:
for every j-th Coop.
It is easy to see that, in general, if goods are perfect substitute ( = 1) the model yields the extreme prediction that the presence of even just one Coop in the market pushes PMFs out of the market. This could, alternatively, be interpreted as if the presence of Coops has obliged all PMFs to adopt a perfectly competitive behaviour, in order to stay in the market. In either way, since market equilibrium price coincides with all …rms'average and marginal cost, every consumer's willingness-to-pay for the homogeneous good is just equal to every …rm's marginal cost of production and this implies a welfare maximization (since u 0 = c). These results are condensed in the next proposition. Finally, note that the total market output at the mixed oligopoly X = P k=1;::;n x k is equal to
For m = 0 the above expression coincides with the pure n-PMFs pure oligopoly X (m = 0) = n( c) 2+ (n 1) and for m = n the expression turns into the pure Coop total quantity, with X (m = n) = n( c) 1+ (n 1) . It is easy to see that a pure Coop oligopoly yields a higher output than a pure PMF oligopoly. Moreover, expression (3.10) shows that the output grows monotonically with the number of Coops in the market. Proposition 1. Under mixed oligopoly in quantities and homogeneous good ( = 1), the presence of even just one Coop in the market implies that all PMFs become inactive, that the output is greater than that obtained with all PMFs and that the total welfare of the economy is maximized.
Proof. For the …rst result, note that, when = 1, conditions (3.3) and (3.4) imply the following best-reply functions:
From which:
(3.13)
The total output of the economy is thus given by X j2M
The welfare of the economy is de…ned as the sum of consumers'surplus and of …rms'pro…ts, which in this case are equal to zero. Using (3.1) and (3.13) this becomes:
which is also the maximum welfare obtainable in the market.
Moreover, some simple results can be obtained for 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 2. Under a mixed oligopoly in quantities, for 2 [0; 1] the output of a Coop is always greater than the output of a PMF, that is,
Proof. The …rst result can be easily checked by direct inspection of expressions (3.9) and (3.8). The second result can be proved by noting that, for every j 2 M and every k 2 N , (3.14)
and expression (3.14) is always strictly positive for 2 [0; 1] and n 2. Finally, for every h 2 N nM
is equal to zero for = 0, since
Finally, straightforward manipulations show that for 2 (0; 1),
which is always satis…ed for 2 (0; 1).
3.3.
Welfare Analysis: PMFs vs. Mixed Oligopoly. The analysis of welfare under mixed oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods requires a careful calculation of the interacting e¤ects of the simultaneous presence of Coops and PMFs on consumer surplus and pro…ts in all markets. By the property of quasi-linear preferences, consumers'welfare can be measured exactly through consumers' surplus and this in turn corresponds to the utility of consumers purchasing the goods. Therefore, we can proceed by computing the welfare under all various forms of oligopoly. In a pure PMF oligopoly, for every k-th good produced, the total welfare (T W k ), calculated as the sum of consumers' surplus and …rms' pro…ts is given by
As a result, summing up the total welfare generated in all n symmetrically di¤erentiated markets and using utility function (3.1), we obtain
which, by symmetry, can written as
Under mixed oligopoly, the total welfare generated in every j-th Coop market is given by the area under the demand curve for the equilibrium quantity such that p j (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ) = c j ,
which, using utility function (3.1) can simply be expressed as
Finally, the total welfare under mixed oligopoly can be computed as
which, by the symmetry of every j-th Coop and every h-th PMF, can be written as
Now, by (3.5), (3.8) and (3.9) we obtain the following expressions for the total welfare, respectively, in a pure PMFs'oligopoly
in a pure Coops'oligopoly
and in a mixed oligopoly with m Coops and (n m) PMFs,
which, in turn, can be expressed as (3.18)
Expression (3.18) illustrates the fact that in a mixed oligopoly the welfare is the sum of the welfare generated in the (n m) markets in which PMFs are active and which generated in the m markets in which retail cooperatives are, in turn, active.
For illustrative purposes in the next section we will focus on the case of mixed duopoly compared, respectively, to a pure PMF and a pure Coop duopoly. We show that the presence of Coops can be relatively more bene…cial in some circumstances than in others and, in particular, for speci…c levels of product di¤erentiation.
3.4. The Duopoly Case. The main feature of a mixed duopoly between a PMF and a Coop is which to break the symmetry of …rms' behaviour. When competition is à la Cournot, the best-reply of the Coop is
and which of the PMF is
It is clear that a PMF usually possesses a downward sloping best-reply steeper than a Coop's and therefore its equilibrium quantity is in general lower, that is (3.21)
for the PMF and
for the Coop. It is important to notice that the asymmetry of the two …rms' quantities is mitigated when goods are either highly di¤erentiated (low ) or highly complement ( < 0) since
This is because high product di¤erentiation mitigates competition and aggressive behaviour among …rms, hence decreasing their equilibrium output.
If we compare the output of …rms under mixed duopoly to which of a pure PMF duopoly (denoted x) (3.23)
as well as to the case of a pure Coop duopoly (denoted e x),
we note that since quantities are strategic substitutes (Bulow et al., 1985) Coop's output is positively a¤ected by the presence of a di¤erent type of competitor, while PMF's is not. In terms of price, a PMF competing with a Coop experiences a price reduction with respect to a pure PMF market, given that
Moreover, it is easy to see that
Given the above comparative statics, we can now compare the total welfare generated in all pure and mixed cases. By (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) we obtain that total welfare is, respectively,
in a pure PMF duopoly,
in a pure Coop duopoly and
in a mixed duopoly.
The picture below shows that in term of total welfare a pure Coop duopoly (continuous line) outperforms both a pure PMF duopoly and a mixed duopoly for any degree of good di¤erentiation. This is obvious, given that a pure Coop basically acts as a welfare maximizer. As already proved in proposition 1, under mixed duopoly (dotted line) for = 1 (homogeneous goods) only the Coop remains in the market and the welfare is, therefore, maximized. Moreover, it can be noticed that the relative e¢ ciency of the mixed duopoly with respect to the pure PMF duopoly (circled line) is higher when goods are either complement ( < 0) or highly di¤erentiated. When goods become more and more homogeneous, the welfare loss determined in a pure PMF with respect to the mixed duopoly or to the pure Coop duopoly, decreases progressively, although never vanishes. Similarly, the mixed oligopoly approximates the maximum social welfare better and better for goods becoming increasingly substitute. 3.5. Welfare Comparison with More than Two Firms. With more than two …rms that compete à la Cournot the results obtained above continue to hold. In picture 2 we show a simulation with three …rms competing in quantities. Again, a pure Coop market outperforms all other possible market forms for any degree of good di¤erentiation. However, a simple analytical comparison shows that when goods are substitute ( > 0) in term of total welfare the pure Coop oligopoly becomes less and less advantageous with respect to a pure PMF oligopoly when both n and increase. When competition is high (which happens for high n and ) the di¤erent forms of market do not perform too di¤erently, and the welfare generated is not too dissimilar. This is expressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. When the number of …rms in the market increases and goods become increasingly substitutes (higher ), the di¤ erence between welfare generated in a pure Coop oligopoly and which generated in a pure PMF oligopoly, decreases progressively.
Proof. Straightforward manipulations show that the following expression
(1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n 1)) 2 is monotonically decreasing in both and n for n > 1 and 1 > 0.
When goods are complements, ( 0), the e¤ect of a higher number of …rms on (3.25) becomes positive. . As shown in picture 2, with more than two …rms the presence of Coops are still highly bene…cial in terms of social welfare. It can also be noticed that when both the number of …rms and the substitution rate among goods increase, the relative advantage of Coops in terms of welfare shrinks progressively. Therefore, if the model is not too far from reality and consumer cooperatives arise with the purpose to meet consumers' needs, we should expect them establishing their business mostly in highly monopolistic markets in which goods are either highly di¤erentiated or complements. In the next section, we will consider the case of price competition.
Competition in Prices
It can be interesting to compare the case of quantity competition to that of price competition in order to see if some di¤erences arise. One obvious relevant di¤erence is the fact that, when goods are perfectly homogeneous, Bertrand competition yields the extreme prediction of marginal pricing regardless of the objective functions of …rms competing in the market.
4.1.
Oligopoly with all PMFs. When all …rms are PMFs, we …rstly obtain the direct demand for each k-th good as function of prices,
for k = 1; 2; ::; n and 6 = 1. As a result, every PMF's pro…t function can be written as
Di¤erentiating (4.1) with respect to p k ; yields the best-reply of every k-th PMF as
where p k = (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p k 1 ; p k+1 ; ::; p n ).
By symmetry, the Nash equilibrium price of every k-th PMF is obtained as
with associated quantities:
and pro…ts
4.2. Mixed Oligopoly with Price Competition. Again we imagine that m n …rms in the market behave as Coops. Using (3.1) and (3.4), we obtain the following direct demands for every PMF h 2 N nM ,
for 6 = 1. By (4.4) we can write the pro…t-function of every PMF as function of prices,
and, through simple manipulations, the following mixed oligopoly equilibrium prices are obtained 
with associated quantities, respectively, for PMFs (4.7) x h (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p n ) = ( c) (1 + (n 2)) (1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n + m 3)) and Coops (4.8)
x j (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p n ) = ( c) (2 + (2n 3)) (1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n + m 3)) ;
with every h 2 N nM equilibrium pro…ts given by
A few comparisons can now be made.
Proposition 4.
Under price competition and 2 [0; 1], the mixed oligopoly prices are for all …rms either lower or equal than pure PMF oligopoly prices, that is, p k p h p j for every j 2 M , h 2 N nM and k = 1; 2; ::n. Moreover,
Proof. By expressions (4.2), (4.6) and by the property of Bertrand equilibrium, when goods are homogeneous ( = 1) there is no di¤erence between mixed and pure oligopoly equilibrium prices, since p k = p j = p h = c: When goods are independent ( = 0) all PMFs behave as monopolists under both pure and mixed oligopoly, with p h = p k = a + c 2 while, also in this case, Coops behave as perfectly competitive …rms, setting p j = c. Moreover, for 2 (0; 1) it is easy to check that
which is zero for m = 0 and is monotonically increasing in the number of Coops, since
for n 1: About the second group of results, note that, for = 0
and, for every j-th Coops,
and therefore
Moreover, for = 1, in term of output all types of oligopoly perform similarly with
When 2 (0; 1), a simple inspection of (4.3) and (4.7) shows that, for m 1,
Finally, for 2 (0; 1) we have that
whose both numerator and denominator are strictly positive within the de…ned range of parameters.
Welfare Comparison under Price Competition.
For sake of brevity we relegate in appendix all calculations of total welfare with price competition under both pure and mixed oligopoly. We report here the results, which are not too dissimilar from those obtained for the case of quantity competition. Total welfare under mixed oligopoly with an arbitrary number of PMFs and Coops competing in prices is obtained as (4.10)
where in expression above we have again decomposed the total welfare in two distinct parts. Setting in (4.10) m = 0 we can obtain the pure PMF oligopoly welfare under price competition as
while, setting n = m we obtain the pure Coop welfare as
It can be noticed that the pure Coop oligopoly always yields the economy maximum welfare no matter if competition is à la Cournot or à la Bertrand. Again, for illustrative purposes, in the following section we present the duoply case in order to underline the main di¤erences between price and quantity competition.
4.4.
The Duopoly Case with Price Competition. When both …rms in the market are PMFs, we can compute the following direct demand for every k-th good (k = 1; 2) as function of the price vector (p 1 ; p 2 ), for 6 = 1
and pro…t functions
By pro…t functions di¤erentiation, we obtain the following best-replies for both …rms:
(1 ) + p 1 + c 1 whose solution are, for 6 = 1:
8 < :
and p 1 = p 2 = c for = 1;
with associated quantities equal to:
Let us now immagine that …rm 1 is a pure Coop and …rm 2 a pure PMF. When the Coop distributes entirely its pro…ts, the FOC of the representative consumer's utility becomes, respectively for good 1 and good 2:
from which the following demand functions are derived as function of prices, for 6 = 1:
Pro…t functions can be de…ned as:
Di¤erentiating the two expressions, the following best-reply functions are obtained, which are also the solutions of the problem:
with associated quantities for 6 = 1, 8 8 Note that the equilibrium quanties are obtained plugging into direct demands (4.4) and (4.5) the equilibrium prices. Since the latter are not de…ned for = 1, the equilibrium outputs are similarly not de…ned for this value. Ouput levels for = 1 are simply de…ned as the …rms'direct demnds obtained when all prices are set at marginal cost, i.e.,
and
for = 1. Finally, if both …rms are Coops, their equilibrium quantity will be equal to
It can be noticed that, di¤erently from the case of quantity competition, here the Coop's best-reply is completely independent of the price of its rival. Therefore, under Bertrand competition the speci…c leader-follower con…guration in which the PMF is leader and the Coop is follower would not yield any di¤erence when compared to the simultaneous case presented above. The same cannot be said under Cournot competition. If we now compute the welfare yielded under duopoly, the following expressions, for m = 0; 1; 2, respectively, are obtained as
By plotting the three expressions within the range of does not yield particular di¤erences with respect to the case of Cournot competition, except that here all types of markets, included the pure PMF-duopoly, yields the marginal cost pricing and then the maximum welfare for = 1. Therefore, under Bertrand competition and homogeneous goods we observe a perfect "isomorphism" in the behaviour of all …rms. Extending the welfare comparisons to more than two …rms shows that, again, the analysis is qualitatively similar to that of Cournot competition, as shown in …gure 4. An important di¤erence between Bertrand and Cournot competition emerges in terms of the welfare loss of a pure PMF oligopoly with respect to a pure Coop oligopoly. As shown below in …gure 5, this loss is de…nitively larger under quantity than under price competition and the di¤erence is particularly high when goods are reasonably homogeneous, therefore making under these circumstances the presence of at least one Coop in the market de…nitively more bene…cial under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. Additional welfare comparisons between Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies are relegated in the appendix. 
Concluding Remarks
Although in general consumer cooperatives are well established in many countries, their actual behaviour is still largely unknown and requires additional research, in particular to understand the e¤ects of their strategic interaction with traditional pro…t maximizing …rms in oligopolistic markets. This paper has attempted to make a …rst step in this direction, showing the main e¤ects arising in a mixed oligopoly with pro…t-maximizing …rms and consumer cooperarives competing either à la Cournot or à la Bertand in markets with heterogeneous goods. We have shown that the presence of Coops is bene…cial for industries output and social welfare in mainly two cases. The …rst under Cournot comeptition, when goods are perfectly homogeneous and therefore Coops behave so expansively to expel PMFs from the market, or, if interpreted di¤erently, to oblige them to behave as perfectly competitive …rms, setting a price equal to the marginal cost and making zero pro…t as a result. The second case is when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated, for which the presence of Coops appears particularly valuable for markets, by increasing considerably their output and welfare. In this paper we have also shown that Coops a¤ects relatively more the total welfare under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. Therefore, according to our model, consumer cooperatives should behave in a not too dissimilar way to traditional pro…t maximizing …rms in all retail markets in which goods are highly (but not completely) homogeneous and in which competition happens mostly in prices. As a reaction to these market forces, Coops could attempt to propose their customers genuinely di¤erentiated goods and, in this way, enhance consumers' welfare and accomplish their authentic objective function. The …rst thing to notice is that both expressions are not monotonic in . Moreover, the welfare di¤erences between price and quantity competition are in general larger under pure PMF duopoly than under mixed duopoly. In both cases such a di¤erence is high when goods are complements. When goods are substitutes, we have that in a pure PMF duopoly the di¤erence in welfare between Bertand and Cournot competition increases with beta. Conversely, In a mixed duopoly such a di¤erence …rst increases and then decreases to …nally disappear for = 1. Note that for n > 2, the qualitative results shown above continue to hold.
